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Laughter as resistance:  
the rise of Political Satire  




With the recent rise of the right Wing throughout the world, there has been a 
significant increase in production of countervailing political comedy and satire. 
In the uSa, figures such as donald trump, Kellyanne Conway and Sean Spicer 
have increasingly figured as objects of unbound satire, in shows from Stephen 
Colbert’s to Saturday night Live. Political satire has been recently developing in 
the Balkans as well, especially in Croatia and Serbia, with the work of Croatia’s 
News Bar and Serbia’s 24 Minuta and Njuz.net. Contemporary media theory 
and political science have begun to stress the importance and influence of this 
type of resistance to authoritarianism from the point of view of participatory 
democracy and active citizenship. this article presents the modus operandi 
of Croatia’s and Serbia’s political satirists and examines their approaches to 
resistance by engaging with a set of representative texts and videos.
Key words: political satire, Croatia, Serbia, njuz.net, news Bar, political 
participation
Introduction
this article tackles the two political satire sibling-groups, the Croatian 
news Bar and the Serbian njuz.net (with their televised version, 24 
Minuta), both of which consist of web and televised material, concen-
trating on their written texts. Both can be classified as political satire, a 
subgenre of political comedy. they are published increasingly in online 
format, as political satire is nowadays most successful in online form 
(Baumgartner 2008, 735) worldwide. Political satire in Croatia and Serbia 
have seen a rise in production and audience interest during the last decade, 
almost exclusively due to the work and production of news Bar (Croatia) 
and njuz.net (Serbia). the perhaps single ‘predecessor’ in the Yugoslav 
region (when talking about the audio-visual media) could be seen in the 
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former Yugoslav (nowadays Bosnia) television show Top lista nadrealista, 
or perhaps Zlikavci, yet nothing similar has been seen since the end of the 
show (as an exception, social media user generated content could serve as 
a separate node of analysis, yet this falls beyond the scope of this work). 
Given that political satire is seen as important to the development and 
encouraging of political participation and participatory democracy in 
general (Cao and Brewer 2008, 90, 92), and that political satire has an 
intrinsic educational property (Hariman 2008, 264) – in doona’s words, 
‘political comedy and political identity are connected’, as ‘engagement is 
what comes before participation’ (doona 2016, 125) – it is of some surprise 
that they have not received much academic interest. While some scholars 
have suggested that satire could be linked to political quietism and lack 
of participation (Balmas 2014), research has shown that 79% of the audi-
ence of Njuz.net and 24 Minuta, voted on the elections before the survey, 
so it is safe to say that, at least in the Serbian case, the audience is politi-
cally engaged (jovanović 2018).
Whilst njuz.net has figured in but a few scholarly articles (Kalaba 
2014, Petrović 2015), news Bar has, so far, been completely ignored. 
However work on political satire and comedy at the international level – 
most concentrating on famous american political satirists (Baym 2005, 
Feldman 2007, Baumgartner and Morris 2006, Baumgartner 2008, amaras-
ingam 2011, Colletta 2009, LaMarre, Landreville, and Beam 2009) provides 
groundwork for research on contemporary Croatian and Serbian political 
satire as well.
theory and state-of-the art  
on political satire
Political satire is taken quite seriously by contemporary media schol-
arship. Fox et al. claim that satirical shows such as the daily Show are 
‘just as substantive as the broadcast networks’ campaign coverage’ (Fox, 
Koloen, and Sahin 2007, 222), while others have called the same show a 
new type of journalism (Baym 2005). It can thus be said that ‘political 
entertainment has the ability to generate politically relevant outcomes’ 
(Hmielowski, Holbert, and Lee 2011, 98) by motivating its audience. even 
though a number of studies have shown that audiences follow political 
comedy shows for entertainment (Baum 2005), they ‘may exert a positive 
impact on public knowledge about politics’ (Cao and Brewer 2008, 90) 
and foster a potential for political activation and participative democracy. 
In other words, contemporary theory sees political satire as promoting 
active democracy among an audience, which has, in the case of Serbia and 
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the written production of news Bar and njuz.net, however, are more 
akin to the onion news, a satirical site that has reached worldwide read-
ership. the onion news network has ‘created hyperreal spaces for sati-
rizing public foolishness at every level, leaving few cultural or political 
topics off its agenda’ (Waisanen 2011, 508). unlike news Bar and njuz.
net, the onion began relatively early, in 1988, in print, moving to the 
world wide web in 2007 (Waisanen 2011, 509). By 2008, it reached over 
one million views per week (Stephen 2008). news Bar and njuz.net do 
not publically present their view count, but it is safe to say that they have 
reached iconic status in their respective states, often by following in the 
footsteps of the onion news network. In the words of Waisanen, ‘onn 
denaturalizes the common frames, clichés, and the worn communications 
of the news world, providing viewers with ironic clues to the very situat-
edness of media structures and styles’ (Waisanen 2011, 512–513). addition-
ally, ‘by imitating but also reconfiguring the typical structure, delivery, 
and content of the news media, onn gives its audience a way to identify 
with what they have come to expect on the news while providing an alter-
native lens through which to view such events’ (Waisanen 2011, 513), indi-
cating that such satirical production allows the audience to view events and 
happenings from a different perspective. thus, ‘political humor and partic-
ularly its core modality of parody are essential for an engaged, sustainable, 
democratic public culture’ (Hariman 2008, 253). In simpler terms, polit-
ical satire is taken seriously by its audience, having in mind that conven-
tional journalism has already been reported as facing a “crisis of authority” 
(Carlson and Peifer 2013), as “political comedy’s use of irony, parody and 
self-deprecation is what makes it different from conventional news, as it 
invites something different from the engagement of its audience” (doona 
2016, 79).
Writing about njuz.net, Petrović wrote that ‘njuz.net’s serious recep-
tion (as reflected in the professional journalism society’s award, the fact 
that it is largely considered a news source and not entertainment, and 
its becoming a self-sustaining enterprise that provides full-time employ-
ment for six people) and its increasing popularity and visibility in the 
Serbian media justify a closer look at this phenomenon’ (Petrović 2015, 
291), essentially confirming Baym’s categorization of contemporary polit-
ical satire as a new and important type of journalism. this is due to the 
serious issues tackled within njuz.net (the same could be said about news 
Bar), as ‘perhaps the most interesting clusters of njuz.net articles are the 
ones relating to the process of Serbia’s accession to the european union. 
the prolongation of Serbian acceptance to the community of european 
nations, infinite as it appears to the majority is seen to be caused primarily 




economic reforms’ (Kalaba 2014, 4). on the other hand, news Bar tends 
to concentrate mostly on Croatia’s societal and political failings after and 
despite joining the eu. Both tend to satirize and ridicule a slew of soci-
etal and (primarily) political issues within their respective countries, from 
cases such as Croatia’s president, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, and her ‘apolo-
gizing’ for sending Serbian chocolates to Croatian children, to the Serbian 
government’s grand opening of an elevator in a home for the elderly. njuz.
net and news Bar have had a plethora of objects for their satire, oftentimes 
covering issues that have already been presented on national television, 
thus contributing even to the spread of information, however contorted 
they might get in its satirical presentation.
the societal and political context  
in Serbia and Croatia
understanding contemporary political satire in the two countries cannot 
be attained without putting it into a broader, political and societal context. 
Both Serbia and Croatia emerged from the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s 
(see: jovanović 2017, López-Barajas 2016, andjelic 2014, transchel 2007, 
Gagnon jr 2010, Kecmanovic 2002, denitch 1996, Spencer 1998, Lucarelli 
2000). even though some authors stressed the difference in democra-
tization between Croatia and Serbia (Zakošek 2008), the results of the 
(unsuccessful) democratization in the two countries show marked simi-
larities: the diminishing freedom of the press (the Freedom House report 
on both states designate the press in Croatia and Serbia as ‘partly free’, 
see: freedomhouse.org), increased authoritarian tendencies (Milačić 2017), 
as well as poor economy development (deskar-Škrbić and Šimović 2017). 
Both governments have been involved in numerous scandals, such as the 
Croatian case of one of the ministers, Zlatko Hasanbegović, openly flirting 
with fascism (n1 Hrvatska 2017), to the now infamous demolition of the 
Savamala region in Belgrade by masked men during the election night of 
april 24, 2016, where the state ombudsman came to the conclusion that the 
operation was planned and coordinated (Mihajlović 2016). one person died 
in the aftermath, and the courts and the police have not made the slightest 
progress in investigating since. these are just the tip of the iceberg, as scan-
dals have occurred at an alarming rate during the past several years. all 
of these, including smaller-scale, local happenings, have been tackled by 
njuz.net and news Bar, whose written (online) and televised production 
has been extensive. especially with the diminishing quality of the (prima-
rily) traditional media via the proliferation of so-called ‘fake news’ (see: 
allcott and Gentzkow 2017, Lazer et al. 2018, Shu et al. 2017, tandoc jr, Lim, 
and Ling 2018), political satire has gained in importance. With the perva-
siveness of the World Wide Web, njuz.net and news Bar have been able 
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to reach their targeted audiences with more ease as well, enabling a devel-
opment of political satire on a higher scale. We shall now concentrate on 
several representative examples of their discourse, looking into the topics 
and their modus operandi.
discursive production
Similar to the onion news, where ‘onn’s material is state of that partic-
ular art because their productions are almost indistinguishable from the 
programmes they’re imitating’ (Sharp 2008, 4), news Bar and njuz.net’s 
modus operandi is based on copying the style of standardized contempo-
rary journalism. Having in mind that ‘satire is defined as a form that holds 
up human vices and follies to ridicule and scorn’ (Colletta 2009, 859), 
that it is ‘an attack on or criticism of any stupidity or vice in the form of 
scathing humor’ (Cuddon 1991, 202), the ridicule is achieved via faithfully 
copying standardized journalist reporting, yet with a strong dose of irony 
and exaggeration. as Colletta wrote, ‘irony has been a means to expose 
the space between what is real and what is appearance, or what is meant 
and what is said, revealing incoherence and transcending it through the 
aesthetic form and meaning of a work of art’ (Colletta 2009, 856). Hyper-
bolic ‘reporting’ is used as a means of emphasizing the object of ridicule. 
additionally, almost identically to the onion network, news Bar and njuz.
net resort to the tactics of recursivity, defined by Waisanen as ‘a process 
by which rhetors leverage past and present resources toward innovation’ 
(Waisanen 2011, 515), similar to what LaCapra described in 1983 as ‘repeti-
tion with variation over time’ (LaCapra 1983, 44).
We are approaching the subject from a text analytical perspective, 
which is closely related to Critical discourse analysis, though without the 
purely linguistic emphasis. In the words of Michael Stubbs, ‘sometimes this 
terminological variation signals important conceptual distinctions, but 
often it does not, and terminological debates are usually of little interest’ 
(Stubbs 1996, 2). drawing on Fairclough, we are interested in intertextu-
ality, for ‘whereas linguistic analysis shows how texts selectively draw upon 
linguistic systems, intertextual analysis shows how texts selectively draw 
upon orders of discourse – the particular configurations of conventional-
ized practices (genres, discourses, narratives, etc)’ (Fairclough 1992, 194). 
We shall thus draw upon these broader societal discourses, and see how 
they relate to the production of news Bar and njuz.net. text selection was 
based upon the Grounded theory approach, that works ‘with individual 
cases, incidents or experiences and develop[s] progressively more abstract 
conceptual categories to synthesize’ (Charmaz and Belgrave 2007, 28). It 
is based on the procedure of subsumption, that ‘proceeds from an already 




who steal from a medicine chest are drug addicts), and seeks to find this 
general context in the data (e.g. the unknown burglar has robbed the medi-
cine chest) in order to obtain knowledge about the individual case (e.g. 
the unknown burglar is a drug addict). the logical form of this intellec-
tual operation is that of deduction: the single case in question is subordi-
nated to an already known rule. Here a tried and trusted order is applied to 
the new case’ (reichertz 2010). thus, knowing the broader socio-political 
context, we looked at production of news Bar and njuz.net, and selected 
several cases accordingly. due to the constraints of a research article, only 
the most prominent examples were selected. the samples are taken from 
the online production of news Bar and njuz.net, at their websites, njuz.net 
and news-bar.hr. the material from their corresponding television shows 
is available on Youtube. the following articles/video clips are used in the 
paragraphs to come:
’A Serbotaur born in Knin, a mythical creature with the head of a Serb, 
and the body of a Croat’ (News Bar)
’Hasanbegović wishes to change the name of tomorrow’s celebratory day 
to the Day of Anti-antifascist struggle’ (News Bar)
’The president was devastated as she could not be photographed putting 
the fire out’ (News Bar)
’A rare phenomenon in the sky: If you should miss tonight’s address to 
the nation by Vučić, you will have to wait for the next one for one whole 
day’ (Njuz.net)
’The Government of Serbia proposes that every ID document should have 
the picture of Aleksandar Vučić’ (Njuz.net)
’Twitter decided to step up as the leader of the opposition’ (Njuz.net)
’The offices of the Croatian Radio Television moves to Kaptol in order to 
be closer to its editorial board’ (News Bar)
Episode 103, 24 Minuta (Njuz.net)
’Gynecologist with a religious conscientious objection’ (News Bar)
Consequently, the question we want to ask within this article is about 
what the main discursive properties of the production of njuz.net and 
news Bar are – how they manage their production of parody, and what 
their production draws upon (the material is taken from the ongoing 
decade, primarily newer material).
Let us take a look at the first example, the news Bar text ‘a Serbo-
taur born in Knin, a mythical creature with the head of a Serb, and the 
body of a Croat’ (news bar, 2017a), in which the following was claimed: 
‘for the first time in history of our peoples, a child has been born with a 
Croat mother and Serb father ... the boy from a mixed marriage, at first 
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glance, looks like any other child, but Croat and Serb nationalists claim 
it has a head of a Serb and the body of a Croat, for which he is feared by 
both types of nationalists. even though united in their fear, the Croat and 
Serb nationalists have diverging views on whether it is his body or his head 
that is monstrous’. this short text plays off the ethnic hatred and severe 
reduction in frequencies of so-called ‘mixed marriages’ between Serbs and 
Croats, starting from the early nineties onwards (Hayden 1996, Massey, 
Hodson, and Sekulić 1999), as there was an increase in ethnic distancing 
and mistrust (Kandido-jakšić 2008). Written in the language of standard 
journalism, the text exaggerates by introducing a nonexistent, mythical 
figure of the ‘Serbotaur’, which represents the ‘horror’ of ‘mixed marriages’ 
in its horrid persona, as seen by both Croat and Serb nationalists, stressing 
the similarity between Serbian and Croatian nationalism, the only differ-
ence being in that they accuse the other side of ‘monstrosity’. the story 
is published in the textual style of ‘real’ news (as opposed to today’s ‘fake 
news’), as if it were but one among the plethora of other newsworthy topics 
to be presented to the audience. additionally, it is hyperbolic, with the 
hulking image of the ‘Serbotaur’ placed in the center of attention.
In a different text, titled ‘Hasanbegović wishes to change the name 
of tomorrow’s celebratory day to the day of anti-antifascist struggle’ 
(news bar, 2017b), minister Hasanbegović’s constant flirt with Croatia’s 
ustaša past. In an invented quote, the virtual Hasanbegović explains: 
‘the day of the Struggle against Fascism is a name that spread hatred. 
So, you have a negative prefix anti, which is in and of itself a bad connota-
tion. Whence the phobia against fascism? the fact that somebody thinks 
differently from you is not a reason to fight them, as in this case, with 
fascism. one should develop tolerance towards differences and respect 
everybody’s political orientation, unless it is sexual’. Hasanbegović was 
then described as ‘not really fascist, he only has a U on his forehead’, indi-
cating the Croat ustaša’s symbol. the whole text ridicules Hasanbegović’s 
regular anti-democratic discourse, by use of which he has gained a reputa-
tion as an ‘icon of the right Wing’ (Hrvatska 2017). as Hockenos reported 
for Foreign Policy, ‘Hasanbegovic had been a prominent figure in a small 
ultra-rightist party that openly extols the fascist World War II-era ustashe 
movement (he left the party and is now unaffiliated, though he has never 
renounced it). as a historian, his work focuses on downplaying the crimes 
of the ustashe and cautiously rehabilitating its ideas’ (Hockenos 2016). the 
resurgence of fascist thought has been a serious problem in contempo-
rary Croatia.
’the president was devastated as she could not be photographed putting 
the fire out’ (news bar, 2017c) was an article published by news Bar in 




a non-existent photography in which she is quenching a fire’, commenting 
on the common proclivity of local politicians to present themselves in a 
positive light. the story read: ‘the president of the republic of Croatia 
confirmed the resignation of the defense Minister ... as the fire was put out 
before she managed to photograph herself in a fireman’s suit while actively 
putting the fire out’. this points to the potential firing the Minister of 
defense, who in fact fulfilled his role at the position on which he is, because 
of his “negative” conduct, drawing an unsaid conclusion that ‘doing one’s 
job’ is less important than sending a positive image to the public.
In September 2017, njuz.net published the text titled ‘a rare phenom-
enon in the sky: If you should miss tonight’s address to the nation by 
vučić, you will have to wait for the next one for one whole day’(njuz.net 
2017a). aleksandar vučić, the current president of Serbia (who switched 
roles from Prime Minister in 2017, in a Putinesque maneuver), is known 
for his constant presence on the television and in the printed media. the 
text is based on the use of hyperbole, as ‘speaking hyperbolically about a 
negative situation is an example of a contrast of magnitude, yet it is also 
an instance of a person expressing a very negative attitude. as such, it may 
be equally powerful in expressing condemnation as speaking ironically’ 
(Colston and o’Brien 2000, 180), having in mind that exaggeration ‘makes 
the intended meaning of nonliteral statements clearer as less ambiguous’ 
(Kreuz, Kassler, and Coppenrath 1998, 97). vučić was, within the text, said 
to ‘take the stage rarely, only once in a 24-hour period’, playing on the Pres-
ident’s constant presence in the media.
In another recent text, njuz.net played on the 2017 affair in which several 
high ranking members of the government spoke their mind about having 
the picture of President vučić in the Ministry of defense and army facili-
ties; the Prime Minister ana Brnabić having said that ‘the cult of national 
symbols ... should be strengthened’ (n1, 2017), essentially equating the 
President with a national symbol. njuz.net wrote a piece with the title ‘the 
Government of Serbia proposes that every Id document should have the 
picture of aleksandar vučić (njuz.net, 2017b). the text goes on to say that 
‘according to the Prime Minister of Serbia, ana Brnabić, the government 
decided to take steps in this direction after the conclusion that the photog-
raphy of aleksandar vučić in all Ids would contribute to the strengthening 
of the cult of national symbols of Serbia’. the article plays on the impor-
tance of national symbolism in Serbia, that has, since the early nineties, 
become and remained a major trope (Mock 2011), even though the govern-
ment has, pro forma, denounced its nationalist past.
the text ‘twitter decided to step up as the leader of the opposition’(njuz.
net, 2017c), presents the reader with an anthropomorphized vision of the 
twitter social network, in which it ‘decides’ to represent the opposition, 
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‘saying’ that ‘the only thing this government fears is twitter, the only criti-
cism it reacts to is that coming from twitter. this is why we can say that I, 
twitter, am the only one capable of leading the fight against this regime’. 
this text refers to what is nowadays known as ‘clicktivism’ and/or ‘slack-
tivism’ (Karpf 2010, Halupka 2014, Cornelissen, Karelaia, and Soyer 2013), 
referring to a habit of using social media as a platform instead of actual 
social and political action, thus ‘slacking’ by ‘clicking’, which could be said 
to be the modus operandi of many opposition parties in Serbia. It addition-
ally reminds readers of the incompetence of Serbia’s opposition, primarily 
while preparing for the Belgrade elections (supposed to be held by the end 
of 2017), when no coalitions or agreements have been made, even though 
Belgrade is seen as the only location where the support for the President 
can be challenged.
the media themselves – especially their connection to the government 
– is yet another theme of news Bar and njuz.net. news Bar’s article ‘the 
offices of the Croatian radio television moves to Kaptol to be closer to 
its editorial board’ (news bar, 2017d) takes the Croatia’s Catholic Church’ 
excessive attempts to influence and control Croatia’s main national tele-
vision, the Hrt (Hrvatska radio-televizija). It says that ‘by this move, 
as the editor’s office claims, a significantly more f luid correspondence 
between the editorial office and the journalists shall occur, which will now 
get more detailed instructions about the program scheme and leading of 
shows orally, instead of the so far difficult communication via email’. as 
was noted already in 2003, the emancipation and democratization of the 
media (instead of their being under constant influence of the government) 
is judged to be ‘unsatisfactory’ (Zgrabljić rotar 2003, 60), as the govern-
ment is seen to influence the media in a strong manner; the situation since 
2003 has not changed for the better (see: vučković 2016, dellavigna et al. 
2014).
the televised versions of the two hubs of political satire work in the 
same way. In episode 103 of 24 Minuta – the televised version of njuz. net – 
the anchor, Zoran Kesić, tackled the repeating elections in Serbia, claiming 
that his show got ‘more votes than all other shows together, which may not 
have been difficult, since there are no other shows’ (24 Minuta, ep. 103) 
indicating the poor diversity of information that has become a hallmark 
of Serbia under the regime of aleksandar vučić and increasing censorship. 
additionally, it satirizes the Prime Minister-cum-President for his repeti-
tive bragging that he wins by a large margin.
news Bar’s clip ‘Gynecologist with a religious conscientious 
objection’(news bar, 2016) introduces an imagined gynecologist, who due 
to his faith, refuses to examine women at his work place. Croatia is known 




2015) – similar to political orthodoxy in Serbia – including mass protests 
against abortion and an insistence on Catholic ethical mores. this clip sati-
rizes the issue, by imagining a medical doctor who does not wish to engage 
in medical practice. In addition, the standard trope of a professional who 
does not wish/does not know how to do their job is stressed, as nepotism 
and lack of professionalism are seen to run amok in Croatia.
Conclusion
Both news Bar and njuz.net have been consistent, since their inception, in 
ridiculing politics (and society) in Croatia and Serbia, respectively (some-
times even cross-state, occasionally tackling neighboring countries, often 
referred to as ‘the region’ in local media and political discourse). It is safe to 
say that political satire has found a fertile ground, and that it will continue 
to challenge authoritarianism, fostering political consciousness and poten-
tial participation by engaging in direct attacks on authoritarian modes of 
governance and behavior. We have here presented but a few relevant and 
illustrating discursive examples of their production; the sheer volume of 
their work could inspire monographs, and we hope that other scholars 
will contribute.
the discursive modus operandi, so to speak, is consistent, both in 
njuz.net and news Bar, as seen in the examples above, and can be said to 
comprise three elements as most important: 
1) copying the style of classic journalism, 
2) hyperbole (discursive exaggeration), and 
3) concentrating on the most relevant or most salient issues in the 
daily sociopolitical life of their respective communities. 
the classical journalistic style is probably the easiest to follow, with 
the obligatory hyperbole that exaggerates and emphasizes the key points 
in their production. By concentrating on the highly relevant (and often 
inflammatory) issues, news Bar and njuz.net keep holding their audi-
ence’s interest. Since the question of censorship has become more salient 
in the recent years (especially in Serbia, with the cancellation of the ‘utisak 
nedelje’ weekly talkshow, as well as shutting down of the newspaper vran-
jske novine), the continued operation of news Bar and njuz.net might 
become challenged. Whilst the televised versions can be stopped with 
more ease, it would be more difficult to censor their online editions. Still, 
that might well become an issue in the years to come.
another issue that would need to be addressed in future research is the 
problem of ‘clicktivism/slacktivism’ (Karpf 2010, Cornelissen, Karelaia, and 
Soyer 2013, Halupka 2014), that is, the question (which has been debated 
within the studies on the topic of political satire and participatory democ-
racy) whether political satire pacifies people, who might succumb under 
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the impression that simply watching the show may substitute for real soci-
etal and political action. However, this is a contested topic, and deserves 
future research. What has so far been certain is that conventional modes 
of political action (protests, elections) are the most effective means of 
holding reactionary forces at bay. nonetheless, I believe there are signs 
that political satire can play a role in engaging the public in strengthening 
democratic forces in Serbia and Croatia. 
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Smeh kao otpor:  
uspon političke satire u Hrvatskoj i Srbiji
S nedavnim rastom u snazi i uticaju desnice širom sveta, javila se i intenzivirana 
proizvodnja političke komedije i satire koja pokušava da joj se odupre. u 
Sjedinjenim državama, figure poput donalda trampa, Kelien Konvej, ili Šona 
Spajsera, počele su sve češće da postaju objekti satire, u produkcijama od 
Stivena Kolberta, pa sve do Saturday Night Live. u međuvremenu, politička 
satira se razvijala i na Balkanu, pogotovu u Hrvatskoj i Srbiji, sa radom ljudi 
koji stoje iza hrvatskog news Bar-a, i srbijanskih 24 Minuta i njuz.neta, tokom 
poslednjih nekoliko godina. Savremene teorije medija i političkih nauka počele 
su da naglašavaju uticaj i važnost ovog specifičnog načina otpora autoritarizmu 
sve češće sa stanovišta participatorne demokratije i aktivnog državljanstva; ovaj 
članak predstavlja modus operandi hrvatskih i srbijanskih političkih satiričara, 
te analizira njihove metode i pristupe otporu, sagledavajući njihovu diskurzivnu 
produkciju u slučajevima nekoliko reprezentativnih tekstova i videa.
Ključne reči: politička satira, Hrvatska, Srbija, njuz.net, news Bar, politička 
participacija.
